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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study general equilibria for economies under imperfect
competition. In standard general equilibrium analyses, as typified in Debreu
(1959), Hildenbrand (1974) and Aliprantis et al (1990), perfect competition
is always adopted. It is the supposition that there exists a large number of
participants in markets and they are so negligible as not to influence on every
price. In many real markets, however, it is unimaginable that competitions
are perfect. Therefore, we emphasize the importance of analyzing economies
under imperfect competition.
Analyses of the economies have steadily made progress, nevertheless many
problems still remain to be solved in this research area. One of significant
themes is to construct models which are possible us to analyze the economies
in intertemporal settings. We attack the theme by the standard way of ex
tending economic models confined to a static situation, which were presented
by Negishi (1961), the chapter 6 in Arrow and Hahn (1971), Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972), Fitzroy (1974), Marschak and Selten (1974), Laffont and
Laroque (1976) and Cornwall (1977).
The above contributions have been extended to some directions: At first,
in the relation of increasing returns to scale, a monopolistically competitive
economy was studied by Silvestre (1977). At second, in the relation of com
modity differentiation, general equilibria for the economies were studied by
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Hart (1979), Hart (1985), Pascoa (1993) and Suzuki (2000). At last, the
economies were analyzed by Benassy (1988) in the relevant to the concept of
general equilibria with rigid prices. Together with our investigation, they are
also the important subjects which we must take into consideration when we
discuss genaral equilibria in the context of imperfect competition.
Imperfectly competitive firms have been typically classified into two groups
according to their strategies in partial equilibrium analyses. One is the firms
applying price policies, and the other is the firms adopting production plans as
strategies. We also study these two types of the firms. Besides the traditional
classification, the firms were assorted by Hart (1985) into two categories
according to notions on the ground of price setting behavior, which are referred
to as a subjective demand approach and an objective demand approach. The
hypothesis in the former is that the imperfectly competitive firms conjecture
demands for their products and the firms set prices along the notional demand
curves. The supposition was adopted by Negishi (1961) and it was herited
by Silvestre (1977) and Suzuki (2000). The supposition in the latter is that
the firms fully recognize the demands and thus they can set the prices of
their products on the basis of the actual demands functions. This approach
was chosen by many of the previous literatures. We take another approach.
We consider that the imperfectly competitive firm has a subjective probability
which assigns a measure of feasibility for each event on its production set. We
give the term feasibility to the property that production plans are Just equal to
the total demands. Since it is natural that the firm confronts with uncertainty
on the outcomes, the supposition is Justifiable. We further suppose that the
firm estimates the mean production plan on the basis of the probability and
that as usual, the firm choose the best price strategy giving the maximum
value of the production plans. It should be noted that the expected production
plan is not nacessarily feasible in actual.
In our economic model, there exist finitely many consumers and firms. And
there exist £ + 1 commodity streams on a compact time interval. As usual,
every consumer chooses a consumption stream on the time interval as a price
taker. One of these streams is a production factor and the others are products.
The consumers have no dealings with each other. On the other hand, every
firm behaves as a price setter in contrast to consumers. The firm selects a
production plan on the time interval. One of these streams is a production
factor provided from the consumers and the others are products supplied to
them. The firms also do not business with each other. We consider such
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a simple transaction. Under these hypotheses, we establish the existence
theorem on general equilibria for the economy under imperfect competition
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a behavior of
consumers is discussed. In Section 3, a behavior of imperfectly competitive
firms applying strategies of prices is analyzed. Section 4 defines a monopo-
listically competitive economy and an equilibrium concept for the economy.
The existence of equilibria for the economy is proved.
2. Consumers
We suppose that there exist finitely many consumers in our model. As we
mentioned in Introduction, the consumers select consumption streams on a
time interval. One of the consumption streams is a production factor and
the others are products. Every consumer offers an initial endowment as a
production factor to firms and he/she consumes products provided from the
firms. As usual, the consumer behaves as a price taker.
Let I := {1, • • • ,n} be the set of all names of consumers. Suppose that
for any j E {0, Cj{T) is the space of all continuous functions
Xj : T R on a nonempty, compact subset T of R, which has the topology
induced by the norm ||a;j|  := sup{|a;j(t)|t E T}. Then, we consider
Co(T) X Ci{T) X • • • X C^(r) as the commodity space, which has the product
topology ^  ;= ^ 0 X ^ 1 X • • • X We write the space as C{T) abbreviately.
For any i E I, let Xi C C(T) be the set of all possible consumption plans,
be a preference relation defined on Xi and Cj E C{T) be an initial endowment.
We set up the following assumptions on those concepts.
(A. 1) For any i E I, (i) Xi is nonempty, convex and compact in
(ii) 'S reflexive, complete, transitive, and locally nonsatisted;
(iii) ^ i is locally nonsatisted;
(iv) {a;' E Xi\x' >Zi x} and {x' E Xi\x x'} are closed in 0 for any x E Xi,
(v) {x' E Xi\x' x} is convex for any x E Xf,
(vi) Cj = (eio, 6,1, • • •, en) satisfies 0 < eio < oo and e,! = • • • = = 0.
The norm compactness of the consumption set Xi in (A. l)(i) is indeed strong,
however, the assumption must be set up to obtain positive results. The
condition (vi) means that consumers have only the 0-th commodity stream
as an initial endowment, which is used by firms as a production factor. We
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consider that the other commodities are products provided by the firms. The
others in (A. 1) are already familiar.
Let be the cr-algebra of Borel subsets of the set T. For any j G
{1, • • • suppose that caj{^) is the set of all countably additive signed
measure with the norm ||pj|| := sup{X)^=ibj(Trra)| |{Ti, • • • ,T„} is a parti
tion of T}, then we may consider the set Pj of all prices as follows:
Pj := {pj e caj(,^)||bj|  < CO and Pj{E) ^  0 for any E G ^ }. (1)
For any j G we suppose that caj{^) is endowed with the
weak* topology denoted by a(caj{^),Cj{T)) and that ca(=^) :=
cai{^) X X cai{^) has the product topology cr(cai(<^),Ci(T)) x
• ••X a{ca£{^),Ce{T)), which is denoted by a(ca(^),C(T)) abbreviately.
We assume that the 0-th commodity is the numeraire whose price po is 1
and therefore pj(t)/pQ(t) = pj{t) for any j G {1, • • • ,£} and t E T. Thus,
we may define the price space P as follows:
P:=PiX- - -xP,. (2)
To proceed to analyze a behavior of consumers, we preliminarily provide
some concepts related to productions. We suppose that there exist i firms.
For any j G let Yj be the set of all possible production plans
Uj ) Vj) fo'" the j-th firm, in which each of 77° and pj represents an input
and an output. We assume that the set is a nonempty subset of {Co{T) x
Cj{T), 0Q X Further, we define the set Y of all total production plans
y as a subset of (C(T), ^). As we will mention afterward, the definition of
Y is only delicate. For any i E I and j G {1, • • • let 6ij be a share of
consumer f to a profit 77° -t- {pj,Pj) of the j-th firm. All these concepts will be
in detail explained in the following section. As usual, suppose that a budget set
Bi{y,p) for each consumer is defined by {xi G Xi\xiQ + Y^^j=i{^i3iPj) = ®io +
^ai,x{0,Yfj=i^ijiVj + iVj^Pj))}' then an individual demand correspondence
X* :Y X P ^  E{T) is defined as follows:
X*{y,p) := {x* G Bi{y,p)\yxi G Bi{y,p), x* >Zi Xi). (3)
Lemma l: For any i G /, the correspondence X* has nonempty and convex
values, and the graph {(y,p,a;i) G C{T) x ca{^) x C{T)\xi G X*{y,p)} is
closed in ^ X a{ca{^),C{T)) x
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Proof Since the budget set is nonempty and compact in & under (A. l)(i)
and (vi), it is clear by (A. l)(ii) and (iv) that X* has nonempty values. The
convex valuedness is also clear by (A. l)(i) and (v). Fix any j G {1, • • • A}-
Suppose that Yj x Pj has the topology x a{caj{^), Cj{T)). Then, since
the map {yj,Pj) v'j + iVj^Pj) 'S continuous by Corollary 6.47 in Aliprantis
and Border (1994, p. 260), it may be proved that Bi is continuous under
(A. l)(vi) for any i E I. Hence, the condition is verified by the standard
method. □
3. The imperfectly competitive firms
We suppose that there exist i imperfectly competitive firms in our model.
For the sake of simplicity, we presume that every firm produces one commodity
by using one homogeneous production factor provided from comsumers and
that the firm supplies its product to the comsumers. That is, the firms do
not business with each other. We further suppose that each firm's product is
differentiated from the other firm's products. And thus, every firm may have
an ability to manipulate a price of its product as a monopolistic competitor.
Let J ;= {1, • • • , ^} be the set of all names of firms. For any j G J, let Yj
denote the set of all possible production plans yj:= iVj,Vj)- Each of 77° and
Tjj represents an input and an output. We consider that the production plans
are streams over a finite time horizon. We set up the following assumptions
on the production set.
(A. 2) For any j G J: (i) Yj is a subset of Co{T) x Cj{T) and 0 G Yj\
(ii) Yj is convex, and compact in the product topology x &j.
The first harf of (A. 2)(i) means that each firm chooses simple production
plans as we stated above. The second harf of the assumption is standard,
which means that the firm need not necessarily be in operation. We must
assume (A. 2)(ii) to obtain a positive result.
As we stated in Introduction, we hypothesize that every firm has a subjective
probability assigning a measure of feasibility for each event on the production
set. Let Mj be the set of all the probabilities on 3§{Cq{T)) x ^{Cj{T))r\Yj
for any j G J. The subjective probability should be naturally influenced by
economic environments, that is, total consumption plans, total production
plans and all prices. Let X be the set of all the total consumption streams
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defined by
X Xi + • • • + X„. (4)
A typical element of the set is denoted by x. And let Y be the set of all the
total production plans defined by the sum of V°:
Y:=Yl>+ n n n + ¥,', (5)
in which y,?:= € Y,}. There-
fore, we may define the set of all variables representing the economic
environments as follows:
Q:=X xYx P. (6)
We write an element {x,y,p) of O by u. Although we describe the subjec
tive probability by p,j{- \pj,oj) for technical reasons, it should be noted that
Pj{ n \pj,uj) does not depend on x, yj and pj in u. We set up the following
(A. 3) on the firm's subjective probabilities.
(A. 3) For any j G J, suppose that caj{^) x C(T) x C{T) x ca{^) has the
product topology a{caj{^),Cj{T)) x & x ^  x a{ca{^),C{T)) and Mj is
endowed with the weak* topology, then {pj,oj) iij{ • \Pji'j^) is continuous.
From Theorem 2.1 in Billingsley (1999, p. 16), the assumption (i) is equal to
that as {p^.uP) {pj,i^), then \pj{E\p'j,u^) - ij,j{E\pj,u)\ 0 for any
E e ^{Co(T))x^{Cj{T))r\Yj. That is, the function {pj,uj) iJ,j{E\pj,uj)
is continuous for any E G ^ {Cq{T)) x B§{Cj{T)) n Yj.
Using the subjective probabilities, we may define a production plan for the
j-th firm as follows:
■= J^VjPj{yj\Pj^^))■ (V
Lemma 2: For any j G J, iPj,oj) ^ Jy.yjPjiyjlPji'^) is continuous.
Proof Fix any j E J throughout the proof. It is enough to be shown
that one coordinate function {pj,(jj) ^ fyVjP'jiyjlPj^^) continuous since
the other may be proved by the same method. Let f : Yj ^ Cj{T) be a
function associating rjj to yj = {rfj,r}j). Since the function yj {f{yj),Pj)
is continuous for any Pj G Pj and hence it is also measurable, and f{Yj) =
{Vj\yj ^ 's a separable subspace of Cj{T), it is verified by Theorem 2 in
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Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 42) that the function / is strongly measurable, that
is, there exists a sequence of simple functions : Yj Cj{T) satisfying
the condition that as m oo then \\f{yj) — 'f"^{yj)\\ 0 for almost every
yj G Yj. The standard represntation of is given as follows:
'P"'iyj) ■= ^XeMVj- (8)
h=l
We now consider the following inequality for any m £ N:
[ f{yj)dyjiyj\Pj,u})- [ f(yj)dfij{yj\p],u'')
JYj JYj
/ f{yj)dpjiyj\Pj,uj)- / (fi'^iyj)dixj{yj\pj,uj)
JYj JYj
[ 'P"'iyj)dpj{yj\Pj,(^) - [ p"'{yj)dyj{yj\p],uj'')
JYj JYj
[ P"'{yj)dP'j{yj\p],u}'') - [ fiyj)dyj{yj\p],aj'')
JYi JYi
+
+
(9)
We must verify that each term in the right side of (9) converges to 0 as
m —> oo and n ^ oo.
On the first term: By the definition of the function for any
m E N and the basic property of integral \\ JY.f{yj)dpj{yj\Pj,to) —
lYj'P"'(yj)dy'j{yj\Pj^<^)\\ ^ /yJI/(%) - P'^iyMdpjiyjlPj^oj), as m ^ oo,
/ f{yj)dpj{yj\Pj,uj)- p"'{yj)dfij{yj\pj,uj) ^0. (10)
JYj JYj
On the second term: It is clear that the following relation holds for any
m E N:
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Jyj Jyj
P m
=  Y.Xe^ {yj)vidHj ivj \pj,uj)
^yj h-^
~  m (11)
h=l
m
= \\^{y'j{Eh\Pj,oj) - Pj(EhIp],a;"}) .
h=l
That converges to 0 as n —> oo by the assumption (A. 3) and Theorem 2.1
in Billingsley (1999, p. 16). Thus, the required condition is obtained.
On the last term: Fix any m E N before the closing sentence in the
paragraph. Suppose that : Yj ^  R \s 3 function defined by g^iVj) ■=
WfiUj) — <p"^{yj)\\ , which is Lebesgue measurable. Then, from Theorem B
in Halmos (1950, p. 85), there exists a simple function (j)^ : Yj ^ R such
that the sequence is increasing and
for alomost every yj e Yj. Indeed, for any /i e AT and r G {1,2, • • • ,
suppose that E!^ and E^ are defined by E!} := {yj E lj|2~'^(r — 1) ^
9^{yj) < 2~''r} and E'^ := [yj E Yj\g'^{yj) ^ h}, then (p'^ is constructed as
<t>''{yj) ■= E^=12"''(r- - l)XE^{yj) + hxEf^iyj)- Hence, it is shown by (A. 3)
and Theorem 2.1 in Billingsley (1999, p. 16) that for any h E N, n ^ oo ^
\lYj4>^iyj)dPj{yj\p'j,^^'') - JYj(l>''iVj)dpj{yj\Pj,(^)\ -> 0. And the condition
h ^ oo ^ \Jy,(f)^{yj)dpj{yj\pj,u) - /y.^"'(i/j)dAj(%|Pi,^)l ^ 0 follows
from Theorem D in Halmos (1950, p. 110). Accordingly, ash oo and n
GO, the property \Jy,(t>^{yj)dpj{yj\p],uj'') - JY.9'^{yj)dpj{yj\Pj,oj)\ ^ 0 is
obtained. Since ip'^{yj) ^ 9^{yj) for any h E N and almost every yj E Yj,
/v'/''(%)^^Ai(%|P^w") ^ /y/'"(%)c^Ai(%|P^'^")- Hence, from the above
conditions, \Jy,g'^{yj)dpj{yj\p'p,u)'') - jY.9 {yj)dpj{yj\Pj,oj)\ ^ 0 as n
DO. Thus, by the definition of g^, as n —> oo.
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LWfiyj) -
(12)
- [ Wfivj)-^""{yMdi^jivjlPj,^)
Jy,
0.
Since the second term Jy llfiyj) — V"^{yj)\\dl^jiyj\Pj,^) —>• 0 as m ^  oo,
the required result is obtained. □
Now that the properties of the function (pj,oj) Jy yjP'jiyjlPj^'^) have
been discussed, we may proceed to investigate a profit function of a firm. For
any j E J, the profit function Wj : Pj xQ R of the j-th firm is defined as
follows:
Trj{pj,u) := max^J^r]^di^j{yj\pj,uj)
(^J^Pjdfij{yj\pj,uj), pj^ pj G Pj}.
Remark The strategy set Pj for the j-th firm is bounded by the definition
(1). We must suppose that the set has a sufficiently wide range so that the
firm can choose the prices guaranteeing positive profits. This also means that
potential firms are excluded, which have no option but to choose the strategy
Pj with llpjil = CO to obtain the maximum profit Trj{pj,uj) — 0.
Further, the best strategy correspondence Pj of the j-th firm is
defined as follows:
PjM ■= {pi e Pj Tj(pi.<^) = J
JYi
(14)
Before we investigate propertiesof the profit function and the best strategy
correspondence, we set up the following assumption.
(A.4) For any j E J and u E P, the function pj i-* Jy,PjdfXj(yj\pj,uj) +
{lY Vjdpj(yj\pj,u)), Pj) is quasiconcave.
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This may be construed as follows: Firms suppose that a profit obtained by
choosing moderate prices is greater than that gained by selecting excessive
prices. Thus, the firms hesitate to choose 'small profit and quick return'
policies under low prices or production plans aimed at high returns under high
prices. The supposition is indeed strict, however, it may be justified if the
firms have a tendency to adopt affordable prices.
Lemma 3: For any j € J, the correspondence Pj has nonempty, convex
values and a closed graph.
Proof : For any j G J, Pj is a a{caj{^),Cj{T))-compact subset
of caj{^), for example, by Theorem 6.25 in Aliprantis and Border
(1994, p. 250). Therefore, under (A. l)(i) and (A. 2)(ii), O is compact in
&  X G{ca{M{T)),C{T)). Since the function tFj is continuous by Lemma
2 and Corollary 6.47 in Aliprantis and Border (1994, p. 260), the nonempty-
valuedness of the correspondence is obvious. The convex-valuedness is also
clear by (A. 4). The closedness of the graph may be shown by the standard
method under the result of Lemma 2. □
4. The existence theorems
(D. 1) := ((C,(T), ca,(S-)), • ■ ■, {Ce(T), ca,(:T)),
{(-^j) fci) 6i)}i6/) {(^') AjOlje-T) P-}
In the definition, P is treated as a component of the economy since P is
the strategy sets of the firms. We define an equilibrium for the economy S'
as follows:
(D.2) An equilibrium for the economy S under imperfect competition is the
list {x*, jy^yidpi{yi\p\,uj*), • • • , fulfilling the next
conditions:
(i) For any i e /, x* G Bi{y*,p*) satisfies (Vxj G Bi{y*,p*), x* Xi);
(ii) For any j E J, Pj E Pj satisfies the condition Trj{yj,uj) =
max{JY,7]^dpj{yj\p*,u*) + {fy,r]jdpj{yj\p*j,uj*), pp};
("OEie/^io - ^ ^ and for any j E
{!> • • • , - lY,Vjdpj{yj\Pj,oJ*) ^ e.
59
We set up the last assumption (A. 5).
(A. 5) Suppose that u := {x, y,p) is a state satisfying the following conditions:
an element of x is for any j 6 {1, • • • ,£}, and an element of
y is jYj'^jdpj{yj\pj,uj) for any j G {1, • • • Then, for any j G J,
= / rijdpj{yj\pj,u). (15)
iei
Theorem Under the assumptions (A. 1)-(A. 5), there exist the equilibria
for the economy S under imperfect competition.
PROOF: Let A* : ^ A be a correspondence defined by:
X\uj) := Xl{y,p) + • • • + X:{y,p). (16)
Let y* : 17 y be a correspondence defined by:
(17)j VedfJ'eiye\Pe,<^)^^'^j e {1,• • • Pj e
And let P* : 17 ^  P be a correspondence defined by:
P*{uj) := Pf{u) X • • • X Pf{u). (18)
Further, we define the correspondence F : Q Q as follows:
F{u) := X*{u) X Y\u) x P*{uj). (19)
It is shown by Lemma 1, 2 and 3 that the correspondence F has nonempty,
convex values and a closed graph. Thus, it is proved by the Fan-Glicksberg
fixed point theorem (Fan (1952) and Glicksberg (1952)) that F has fixed
points (jj G F{(jo).
At the fixed point oj, it is clear that the conditions (i) and (ii) in the
definition (D.2) are satisfied.
From the assumption (A. 5) and Walras' law, the condition (iii) in (D. 2) is
also true.
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It should be noted that an element Pj G Pj may be Identified with pj in
the set Li{T, <^,Pj) of all integrable functions on T whose pairing is given
by {pj,Xj{i, •)) := JTPji't)^ji'^^t)dpj{t). Therefore, pj represents prices on
the time interval, which has a natural economic interpretation.
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